Huls:<\/strong> Previous regulation of financial services to consumers in the Netherlands is no longer appropriate. Behavioural aspects of contract law. New wave of consumer protection. Also too big to fail, power relations, bankruptcy, credit databases etc…<\/p>\nThe European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC) promotes ‚productive credit‘ as the key concept for modern law. In this context, the substantive credit contract itself must reflect its life-time character, so that many contractual concepts from one-spot commercial market transactions do not apply here. Under this approach to contract law, consumer bankruptcy (which is part of civil procedural law) comes too late and is critically characterised as a means of ‚keeping substantive contract law free from social poison‘.<\/p>\n
Nicolussi:<\/strong> ‚contract‘ is a term in Italian that often refers to the terms and regulation of the contract and not just the agreement. Mixture of liberty and rules, autonomy versus heteronomy. Subordination can be formal and\/or substantive (structure, power of parties). Unlike housing, supplying ones labour involves work with oneself (performances). Explore the idea of autonomy of being (ethics).<\/p>\n2010<\/em>: example for discussion: Informed consensus in longterm relations between consumers as investors with regard to banks.<\/p>\nAntoniolli:<\/strong> Practical problems instead of concepts. We need a workable definition and not just social justice. Define what a ‚long-term contract‘ is and what a ‚consumer‘ is (Community law may differ). Include administrative and procedural rules. Involve tenancy law which differs from country to country?<\/p>\nReifner:<\/strong> Is substantive law (responsibility) the answer or is procedural (fairness) best. Time or duration is the key. Do we really need to involve behavioural economists? Tenancy law can be carried out by consumer credit experts from the group because tenancy law is similar to credit law (60% of all consumer law is credit law and no longer sales law). We should not exclude other fields by principle, however in practice we will focus on the competencies we have among us 12 partners.<\/p>\nKocher:<\/strong> Instead of long-term contracts basic living conditions need to be defined. Importance of procedures and representation in labour law.<\/p>\nHowells: <\/strong>Consumer contracts are still seen as spot contracts and thus this area needs to learn more than the others. Develop principles first and then find contracts that match.<\/p>\nKezuka<\/strong>: Neutrality of contracts, emphasised dimensions of time and space.<\/p>\nDock\u00e8s<\/strong>: Use language that is not specific at the start. We just need to move on first.<\/p>\nCFR 2012<\/h1>\n
Shortfall of the DCFR:<\/strong><\/em> Just one model which we want to juxtapose with our social contracts model. Our criticism lies in why tenancy, credit, labour law have all been excluded from the DCFR exercise, and explains why we do not see it as complete and why we are thus looking at other common frames of reference in excluded contracts. We can find common principles in these 2 branches. Credit contracts were excluded from the DCFR because DG SANCO was not competent for financial services. However, people involved in the DCFR have all been trained on issues of commercial\/sales law which explains why they have thus missed the social dimension which we are defending.<\/p>\nReifner<\/strong> 2010: The EU Commission has now officially installed a Commission of 20 experts to draft a Common Frame of Reference for a future European contract law. It is based on the given DCFR which we already criticized for its omittence of longterm contract and social problems of workers, tenants and borrowers. Since the expert group will be dominated by the advocates of the DCFR (i.e. Schulte-N\u00f6lke, Whittaker, Beale, Hesselink, Cleave, v. Bar etc) reflecting its deficiencies we think that our endeavour becomes more urgent, necessary and also politically useful. This is also true since the Economic and Social Committee of the EU wants to promulgate the future CFR as a 28th regime allowing parties to opt out from the application of their national contract law. The Commission has already taken up this proposition in its inauguration for the expert group.<\/p>\nWe could show the increasing signatories of the Finance Watch Initiative that they should be concerned with the way consumer finance and banks will be regulated in the DCFR. We could show that the decrease in size and effectiveness of collective agreements could be matched by turning more consciously to the other field of workers‘ rights: individual contracts. We even could add collective elements to the CFR like collective agreements or unilateral declarations or good faith principles.<\/p>\n
Gonzalez\/Monti paper on Europe 2030<\/em> admits that the existing models including its legal counterparts have to be revised because „in the last two decades, the EU’s potential to generate growth and jobs, and consequently to improve living standards, has lagged behind that of its main trading partners.“ (p 15). There is also a new inter-party group at the European Parliament called „http:\/\/www.finance-watch.org“ which will defend regulation for banks in response to the financial crisis: Their declaration starts with „We, as European elected officials in charge of regulating financial markets and banks, can see every day the pressure exerted by the financial and banking industry to influence the laws governing it.“<\/p>\nHowells <\/strong>2010: <\/em>For me the most pressing issue at the moment if this question of the optional instrument. Some people even hope that both the CFR and Consumer Rights Directive will be jettisoned in favour of a 28th regime. I myself favour keeping consumer law distinct from any general contract law reform. Again a purely personal statement, but I do not think one page political statement are really something I want to be part of. The nuances of the arguments cannot be expressed and there is a risk we lose our independent academic voice. I even wonder if these statements have an impact. But others are of course are free to sign up. I still think we have a good basis for a research project. This may simply require us building up a number of bilatteral projects that we can involve the team in. I would also be prepared to devote free time to review UK law from our perspective, but I think we need to consider what our objective are the best means to meet them.<\/p>\nRamsay:<\/strong> 2010 <\/em>All agree that the existing European initiatives in contract law neglect the relational contract literature (e.g. Macneil). Credit card contracts and other consumer financial contracts often last for many years and may be adjusted or changed during this period. Consumer credit contracts may also include networks of financiers, intermediaries and suppliers. While credit law has partly recognized network contracts, further analysis could be valuable. Four obvious issues arise in this context. 1. The expectations of adjustment e.g. interest rate changes and mechanisms for addressing this. 2. The expectation of trouble and its recognition (e.g. social force majeure) and the need for mechanisms of adjustment: structured bargaining , the role of third parties-courts, private institutions etc. 3. The role of consent at the time of entering the contract is diminished. 4. The assignment of liabilities within credit networks. Our discussion could explore the application of insights from relational contracting to consumer credit law<\/p>\nBob Schmitz <\/strong>2010: <\/em>Merci de faire part du message suivant \u00e0 Udo : A ce stade, le CFR ( Common Frame of Reference ) ne travaille que sur les contrats en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et des questions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales comme le „good faith & fair dealing.“ Ce qui me serait fort utile \u00e0 ce stade : les commentaires critiques sur le DCFR . Plus tard, je serai \u00e9videmment pr\u00eat \u00e0 me battre sur des questions contractuelles particuli\u00e8res comme souhait\u00e9 par votre Groupe.<\/p>\nDimensions<\/h1>\nPrice<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nMarket power<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nSocial problems of real persons<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nAccess and Information<\/strong><\/h2>\nRamsay\/Williams: <\/strong>Neo-liberal regulation promotes access to consumer credit and the creation of confidence in an expanding and competitive consumer credit market.6 Consumer choice and the promotion of individual management and responsibility for one’s finances are assumptions guiding regulation. Regulation within neo-liberalism assumes that consumer credit is beneficial by permitting income smoothing over an individual’s life cycle, for example permitting younger consumers to accumulate assets during periods of low income and addressing temporary income deficits.7 Facilitating access to consumer credit is promoted as contributing, albeit indirectly, to alleviating poverty in developing countries<\/p>\nEarly Termination<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nRisk allocation<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nVariety in Sources of law<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nParticipative\/Collective procedures<\/strong><\/h2>\nHuls<\/strong> 2010: Introduce Collective dimension: Supervision by the state is classic paternalistic intervention. However, the state can also nudge the consumer side by means of indirect interventions that create more space for autonomous societal developments. Two Dutch practices in the context of modern consumer protection are worth mentioning here. An important recent Dutch legal innovation is the Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims (WCAM), on the basis of which a court can declare as binding a settlement that has come about following a collective action. A second, more harmonious type of collectivisation is negotiation between consumer organisations and central business organisations about general legal provisions governing consumer transactions.<\/p>\nHuls<\/strong> 2010<\/em>: From my perspective, however, procedural law – which is generally considered to be a very dull field of civil law – is an exciting field to explore the autonomy-paternalism tension, because it constitutes a battleground for competing claims of all kinds of creditors, both among themselves and vis-\u00e0-vis their debtors. Bankruptcy is the litmus test of the strength and weaknesses of civil obligations and liabilities. (see also Kocher, Perez-Carillo)<\/p>\nSocial Problems<\/strong><\/em><\/h1>\nOverindebtedness<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\nHenrikson<\/strong>: The amendment to the bankruptcy procedure will therefore make it possible also for business proprietors who are natural a person and have business activity of simple character to obtain debt restructuring. Note, of special interest is that in Swedish law a natural person remains personally liable for debts outstanding after a bankruptcy.The reason behind the proposed amendment is that for many entrepreneurs who are declared bankrupt, failure spells private financial disaster and a heavy burden of debt precludes any new entrepreneurial activity for a long time ahead. Newer debts will not prevent the debtor from getting debt restructuring.<\/p>\nUnemployment<\/strong><\/h2>\nHomelessness<\/strong><\/h2>\nIllness, Separation, Poverty, Immigrants etc.<\/strong><\/h2>\nFuture Work<\/h1>\n
Group 1 (European Contract Law):Antoniolli,Nybergh,Perez-Carill\u00f3,Nicolussi <\/span><\/em>: Social contracts are: Durable contracts where parties have an unequal negotiating power and whose objective is to satisfy relevant\/basic needs for the weaker party of the contract. Tenancy law was not seen as very serious. Importance of where the rules are placed. Differentiate between changes in circumstances by whether these were foreseeable or not.<\/p>\nGroup 2 (Labour Law): Nogler,Dock\u00e8s,Kocher,Pilgerstorfer<\/span><\/em>: 3 Essential characteristics: power, human involvement, ‚time thickness‘ (or size of time interval). Must take account of basic\/relevant needs, thus suggest: „Life essential contracts“ (Reifner commented that ‚basic needs‘ and ‚first necessities‘ were terms already employed and defined in EU Directives). Basic need versus participation. Dock\u00e8s explained bargaining power and the economics behind why trade unions are worth creating because the benefits outweigh the costs associated with self-organisation.<\/p>\nGroup 3 (Consumer credit):Reifner,Howells,Huls<\/span><\/em>: Cultural differences exist. Usury ceilings and black market for credit provision were discussed. Procedural aspects should be part of the project i.e. thus bankruptcy law will be incorporated. ECRC principles<\/a><\/span> for responsible credit and other codes of best practice will be looked into. E.g. The UN guidelines influence legal developments in many countries from Australian law to those of developing countries. They noted that participation is different to enforcement, and also said that a definition of „institution“ would be necessary.<\/p>\nAgreed Commitment volunteered by the Partners 2009<\/h2>\n
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